Letters from Baghdad
I departed Iraq in late June 2007. In my twelve months in theater, I saw significant changes. When I arrived, the theater was close to a state of civil war. Our MNF–I Commander, GEN George W. Casey Jr. had been in his position for over three years and would serve until February of 2007. My observation was that we were stagnant in our approach to the effort, the tension between the Iraqi belligerents was growing, Iranian malign influence was on the rise as was Al-Qaeda’s influence. It was difficult for me, a senior Colonel serving on the MNF–I staff, to see a way forward. Unbeknownst to myself and most others, changes were coming.
By December 2006, President Bush had already indicated his desire to increase troop strength and change direction in Iraq. In January of 2007, President Bush announced a plan to increase troop strength by 20,000 in an operation that would become known as “The Surge.” In February of 2007, a new MNF–I Commander arrived, GEN David Petraeus. Along with a new Commanding General, we received an entire new approach to the theater that was more aligned with classic counter-insurgency operations. Although I departed in June of 2007, much of my work, as well as the MNF-I’s staff during the last several weeks of my deployment was committed to preparing GEN Petraeus for upcoming testimony with Ambassador Crocker to the U.S. Congress in mid-September 2007. The fruits of our labor during the change in approach and the “Surge” were only beginning to take shape as I departed. The tangible results of the U.S., coalition, and Iraqi efforts are contained in the testimony of GEN Petraeus during his report to Congress. See Annex Z.
The actual number of troops added during the surge was closer to 30,000, consisting of five maneuver brigades, an artillery brigade, aviation brigade, support brigade, and a division Headquarters. A change in troop strength this large does not happen overnight. Besides the existing strength on the ground of 132,000, there were over 20,000 troops in Afghanistan. The entire deployable assets of the U.S. Army were in a detailed force generation process that brought units home from theater, stripped them of most personnel and equipment, and put them back into a multi-year process to rest, refit, and prepare for redeployment. The process to surge forces by 30,000 put immense pressure on an already stressed system. During the first half of 2007, these forces were brought into theater and prepared for operations. These troops were concentrated in the Baghdad area, “thickening” the existing belts around the city. This was the “Surge of Forces.”
Rather than slowly “boiling the frog” by putting arriving forces straight into operations upon arrival, gradually increasing the operational tempo, new forces were sequestered until the inflow of forces was completed. The second half of 2007 began the “Surge of Operations” that resembled a thunderclap and dramatically changed the dynamics of the Iraqi Theater.
Along with the significant efforts against Shi’a Militias in and around Baghdad, efforts against Iranian IRGC Qods Force dramatically increased. The continued efforts, particularly in al Anbar Province with the “Awakening Program” arming, paying, and organizing the Sunni tribal forces against Al-Qaeda and the engagement with Sunni insurgent groups began to show real progress. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was defeated. Shi’a Militia groups, particularly Badr Corps and Jaysh al-Mahdi, were significantly degraded.
The dramatic improvements in the security environment throughout Iraq allowed the Iraqi government at the national, provincial, and local levels began to show a greater ability to practice “good governance.” Iraqi police and military units began to embrace the concepts of Rule of Law and increased professionalism. Although the U.S. casualties rose during 2007, the rise was due to greatly increased operations and the more aggressive counter insurgency program implemented under GEN Petraeus.
The sense of Iraqis at every level was characterized by the often- quoted phrase, “Never in 4000 years of recorded history, has anyone wanted more for us than they wanted from us.” The renewed sense of U.S. commitment was palpable and greatly appreciated. My friend BG (Ret.) Ricky Gibbs, then COL Gibbs, commanded 4th Brigade 1st Infantry Division, one of the “Surge Brigades” in 2007- 08. His brigade was assigned in the Southern Belt around Baghdad and was engaged in some of the heaviest fighting during the 07-08 period. COL Gibbs would occasionally call me back at Ft. Riley, KS, where I was serving as Chief of Staff, 1st ID, to update me on his brigade’s status and activities. I vividly recall a conversation we had in early 2008 as he relayed a day, he spent with the local bishop of the Chaldean Catholic Church. The two of them attended a worship service, attended by other local religious leaders, while local Sunnis worked to repair damage to the church. After the service, the Christians and Sunnis walked to a Shi’a Mosque and worked on repairing war damage. The Iraqi people, regardless of ethnicity or religious sect, were tired of war and embraced the efforts to crush the ongoing insurgency and external influences on their country.
The year 2007 saw greatly increased operations followed by great progress in 2008. By late 2008, Iraq was at a place where a gradual drawdown, followed by a reduced but sustained U.S. presence of arguably 25,000 troops, decreasing over time, would have allowed for continued professionalization of: Iraqi governmental structures, military, and police. This sizable U.S. presence had the capability to protect the Iraqi government from the military as well as the population from the police, and it discouraged Iranian influence while preventing the birth of ISIS.
The inability of the U.S. and Iraq to agree on a Status of Forces Agreement, “SOFA,” was the excuse used by the Obama Administration to withdraw all U.S. Forces from Iraq. There needed to be U.S. resolve to finish the mission. Plus, we needed to quietly inform the Iraqi government that they were not yet ready to protect the fragile institutions or processes beginning to take shape and that we were remaining, in a reduced size, for as long as it would take.
The rapid withdrawal over the next few years set the conditions that led to the rise of ISIS and the required reintroduction of U.S. Forces in 2014.
I never served in Afghanistan, but I studied it in detail and was tangentially involved in several of my last positions. I could never foresee an outcome for Afghanistan that allowed for a fully independent Afghanistan, able to support a viable economy and maintain internal security without continued assistance. This was not the case with Iraq.
Iraq is a country rich in natural resources, oil, gas, water, and most importantly, its people. Iraq has a rich tradition of education, and under Saddam, women had access to education and were well represented in government. The Iraqi legal system is unique by Western standards, a non-adversarial system, that, when allowed to operate independently and without coercion, is a wonderful system based on seeking truth rather than the most expensive lawyers.
The end of the surge operations in 2008 left Iraq ready to move forward in a very positive direction. Our untimely dismantling of this effort for a politically expedient withdrawal resulted in the collapse of immature institutions and truncated the Iraqi evolution towards a shining example of representative government, governed by rule of law in the most strategic part of the Middle East.
The American experience in Iraq had every potential to be unique in our experiments with nation building over the past seventy years. Sadly, once again, we failed to finish the effort.
As I watched Iraq slowly unravel, followed later by Afghanistan, I am struck by the irony of how similar my generation of service members’ experiences mirror the experiences of my father’s generation in Vietnam. Our nation has a great capacity to wage war; however, the nature of a liberal democracy is not well suited to the timelines necessary to make the transition from war to peace.